For many years, farmers worldwide, including in the United States, the European Union, and Canada, received large direct and indirect farm subsidies. This picture changed dramatically beginning in 2006. Prices for oil, grains, oilseeds, and pulses more than doubled. This paper discusses escalating commodity prices in the context of U.S., European Union, and Canadian agricultural programs and policies. These programs are likely to have little effect on world agriculture unless there is a significant drop in commodity prices. These policies should be redesigned to account for the possibility that prices could once again "hit the tank." Higher commodity prices translate into higher food prices worldwide. This, in turn, has motivated importers to lower tariff and non-tariff barriers. Some argue that high food prices have brought about a freer trade environment than would be possible under trade negotiations alone.
U.S. Farm Legislation
Agricultural commodity and conservation legislation in the United States has roots in the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 . Between 1929 and 1932 , net cash farm income fell from US$5.2 billion to US$1.4 billion. With the introduction of new stabilization policies, the magnitude of government transfers to U.S. agricultural producers increased from zero dollars in 1933 to US$28 billion in 2000. As a result, U.S. farm income increased from approximately US$1.4 billion in 1932 to approximately US$56 billion in 2000.
The first U.S. farm bill was passed by Congress in 1933. Until 1970, U.S. farm bills dealt mainly with issues such as rural poverty, soil conservation, crop insurance, and farm credit. The 1970 U.S. Farm Bill introduced direct commodity price supports for the first time. Farm bills from 1970 to 1996 introduced a number of measures such as the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), payment-in-kind (PIK), and the Export Enhancement Program (EEP). The reform act of 1996 introduced dramatic changes such as removing restrictions on acreage set-asides and replacing the target price and deficiency mechanisms with seven annual market transition payments. There were large farm product surpluses between 1970 and 1996. Commodities such as milk and tree fruits had different programs aimed at raising producer incomes and prices. Marketing orders allowed for price discrimination between markets by setting limits on the quantity sold to the high-value market. These orders allowed producers to receive blended prices, which were higher than the competitive price level. They also allowed producers to control quality by specifying minimum grades and sizes. In addition, checkoffs were available for research and development and for advertising.
Key elements of the 2008 U.S. farm program, like the 2003 program, are the loan rate and target price provisions for grains, upland cotton, and oilseeds. The loan rate for corn remained unchanged, as did the target price. This was also true for rice. For soybeans, the loan rates remained unchanged, but the target price was increased by U.S. 20 cents per bushel. For cotton, both the loan rate and target price essentially remained unchanged. For wheat, both the loan rate and the target price were increased, with the latter increasing from US$3.92 per bushel to US$4.17 per bushel (Table 1) . Overall, support prices in nominal terms changed very little. However, in view of the sharp rise in input cost beginning in 2006, real support prices (i.e., loan rate and target price) were significantly reduced.
Figures 1 through 5 put the loan rates and target prices from above in the context of actual prices. Except for cotton, market prices through mid-2008 are significantly above target prices. As a result, there has been a significant reduction in U.S. farm payments since neither the loan rate nor the target price is binding.
Conceptual Framework
A major reason why rising commodity prices have affected food prices as much as they have is because rising commodity prices remove the need for government payments. Historically, in the United States, the latter have kept food prices lower than they otherwise would have been. Consider the basic framework of Figure 6 , where the production quantity q* is established where a given support price (P s ) intersects the water-subsidized supply curve (S ′) at point o instead of at point i, where it would otherwise be if only a price support subsidy were in effect. The addition of the water subsidy to the price support subsidy must necessarily increase q 0 to q*, given that both types of subsidies are binding simultaneously. In addition to the increased output, there is a decrease in the resulting price necessary to clear the world cotton market, P w . For example, under a price support subsidy alone, the market-clearing equilibrium shifts from point e (i.e., no subsidies) to point h; while for a water subsidy alone, the shift is from point e to point k. However, with both subsidies in place, the market-equilibrating shift is from point e to point b.
Under the multiplicative effects (ME) scenario illustrated in Figure 6 , the intersection of the support price (P s ) and the subsidized supply curve (S′) establishes both the output quantity q* (at point o) and the world price P w (at point b). Domestic producers receive the area P s onmeP f as a net gain, while domestic consumers gain the area P f dcP w . The area cdeb (slippage) represents the rents received by importing countries. The cost to the government for the water subsidy is area amno, while the cost of the government price support payments equals area P s obP w . Therefore the combined net domestic cost to society of the two subsidies applied together is the shaded area aedcb. The net cost comparison is made with reference to point e, where P f and q 2 are free from distortions caused by U.S. cotton subsidies.
A key element that determines the size of the welfare cost of cotton is the extent to which domestic production is exported. The greater the exports are, the greater the cost is. Large exports are one of the reasons for the inefficiency cost associated with cotton (Powell and Schmitz 2005) . Table  2 shows that roughly 70 percent of the cotton produced in the United States is exported. Of the major commodities, corn is at the bottom, at less than 20 percent of total production.
In the context of Figure 6 , note that producer prices under a target price specification exceed the equivalent consumer prices. It is this gap that has given rise to large government payments. This model was used to estimate the impact of U.S. cotton policy for 2002 and 2003 . Rossi, Schmitz, and Schmitz (2007 find that the U.S. cotton program depressed world prices somewhere between 10 percent and 20 percent, depending on whether producers made production decisions at the loan rate or target prices.
Figures 1 through 5 show how the world has changed and why the welfare costs of U.S. grains, oilseeds, and cotton are small indeed. Producer prices have risen above the target prices, but accompanying these has been an increase in consumer prices. In Figure 1 , for a market price above the support price, consumers pay an equivalent price. There is no longer a wedge between producer and consumer prices. High consumer prices now pay farmers' variable costs, where before part of this was covered by government payments.
COOL: Producers and Consumers
A controversial element of the U.S. Farm Bill is the country-of-origin labeling (COOL) requirements. Unlike the previous legislation, poultry
Figure 2. Cotton: Loan Rate and Target Prices
also falls under COOL. Unfortunately, there has been little theoretical discussion of COOL effects, nor has there been a great deal of empirical analysis on the subject. COOL can cause food prices to increase even further. Consider Figure 7 , where there are two countries-say, Canada and the United States. The excess supply curve of Canadian beef is given by E s . The supply curve of U.S. beef is S u . The total demand by U.S. consumers for all beef produced in both Canada and the United States is given by D u , where D is the demand by U.S. consumers for beef produced in the United States. Under free trade, Canada exports beef to the United States at price P f . At this point, beef from Canada is a perfect substitute for U.S.-produced beef. The COOL requirements are not new. For example, Florida initiated a COOL statute in 1979 for fruits, vegetables, and honey, and added aquaculture products in 1996. COOL labeling is checked during routine store sanitation inspections. The costs and benefits from labeling have never been empirically determined, but transaction costs due to COOL are likely one important cost component in the food chain. On many products, one sees labels such as "made in Canada" or "made in the United States" under no COOL laws. The companies that use such labels obviously believe that there is a positive rate of return from this type of investment, and the market dictates a return. Why then is there a need for compulsory COOL? Suppose COOL creates a consumer perception of U.S. beef as being of superior quality to Canadian beef, and hence a willingness to pay a higher price for U.S. beef relative to Canadian beef. This has the effect of shifting the U.S. demand for U.S.-produced beef to D c . Now the demand for Canadian beef shifts from D f to D f ′. In equilibrium, the U.S. price rises from p f to p 1 . U.S. producers gain from COOL by p f p 1 ef. In terms of Canadian beef, price falls to p 2 given consumption of q 3 . There is a net loss for Canada of p 2 abp f . Note that COOL acts as a non-tariff barrier, as it creates a price wedge between U.S. and Canadian producers of (p 1 -p 2 ).
What happens if U.S. consumers, because of COOL, viewed Canadian beef as superior to U.S. beef? Consider where U.S. demand for U.S.-produced beef shifts to ED f . This has the effect of shifting the Canadian demand to D 0 , raising the price of Canadian beef to p 4 , and lowering the price of U.S.-produced beef to p 3 . U.S. producers now lose p 3 q f p f from COOL, while Canada gains pfbhp 4 . COOL still acts as a non-tariff barrier, but now the price for Canadian beef exceeds the U.S. price.
In the above discussion, we assume that COOL creates a "product differential effect." If it does not, then COOL merely adds to the costs of producing and selling beef through added transaction costs from labeling. Regardless, transaction costs under COOL essentially shift the aggregate supply of beef upwards.
In the above discussion, it is clear how beef producers in Canada and the United States are affected by COOL. The effect on consumer welfare is much more difficult to determine than on producer welfare. Consider Figure 8 , in which P f is the free trade price and beef is viewed as a perfectly substitutable commodity. U.S. beef production is q f . Now suppose that because of COOL, U.S. beef demand shifts to D c . If this were true, consumer welfare in the United States would fall. This is because of the loss in aggregate U.S. surplus of abP f > (p 2 gh + p 1 dj). However, what if demand shifts to D c ′ instead of D c ? That is, for a given price and quantity, the shifted demand curve becomes more price-inelastic. In this case, consumers (as measured by consumer surplus) in the United States are made better off by COOL (this would have to be the case, or they would not view U.S. beef as superior to Canadian beef).
Ethanol and Market Distortions
The most charged and controversial subject is the production of ethanol from U.S. corn production. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (2008) forecasts that, by 2010, roughly 4.5 billion bushels of the corn grown in the United States, roughly onethird of the U.S. crop, will be used for ethanol production. There is tariff protection on the importation of ethanol production from abroad, along with ethanol tax credits. These encourage There are likely as many supporters of ethanol as there are those opposed to ethanol production from corn. One often hears negative statements about the impact of ethanol production. For example, Michael Grunwald discusses "The Clean Energy Scam" in Time magazine (Grunwald 2008 ). According to Grunwald, "politicians and big business are pushing biofuels like corn-based ethanol as alternatives to oil. All they're really doing is driving up food prices and making global warming worse-and you're paying for it" (Time cover page). Also, high corn prices have large negative impacts on the livestock sector ( Figure 9) . Schmitz, Moss, and Schmitz (2007) and Gardner (2007) use a welfare economics framework to examine the impact of ethanol production from corn in the context of U.S. agricultural policy. They find that ethanol boosts corn prices somewhere between US$0.75 and US$1.25 per bushel, thus eliminating the need for U.S. countercyclical and loan deficiency payments. They further find that the demand for corn for ethanol production could be positive without a tax credit. At least two factors affect ethanol production, namely a favorable oil-to-corn price ratio and a tax credit for ethanol production.
Generally, the authors find that while there are gainers and losers from ethanol production, on net there can be significant welfare costs, but these costs can be small or even negative if ethanol has a significant impact on the price of gasoline from fossil fuels. The findings hinge as well on several other key parameters. A key component is the impact of ethanol on commodity payments. The rise in corn prices due to ethanol has wiped out the need for commodity payments. It is important to identify net benefits and costs from both a world and U.S. perspective, where little weight may be given to foreign impacts such as losses to corn importers. While ethanol certainly benefited U.S. corn farmers, it had a negative impact on livestock producers. On this there is general agreement. An interesting study by FarmEcon LLC for the Coalition for Balanced Food & Fuel, a group representing U.S. livestock, poultry, milk, and egg producers and meat processors, (Elam 2008) . There are at least ten states with costs ranging between US$500 million and US$1 billion.
There is little agreement on the impact of corn prices from ethanol production. At the high end, FarmEcon LLC estimated the price impact at roughly US$1.30/bushel. Gardner (2007) and Schmitz, Moss, and Schmitz (2007) put the price at below US$1.00/bushel. In this regard, caution should be used when interpreting the impact of the ethanol tax credit along with the ethanol tariff on the use of corn for ethanol. A model is badly needed that estimates the impact of these on corn demand. As we point out, given high oil prices, ethanol may well have emerged even without tax credits. Then there is the nagging issue of the impact of ethanol on food prices. FarmEcon LLC estimates that the price impact is significant, while the Agricultural and Food Policy Center at Texas A&M University argues that ethanol has a minor effect on food costs (Anderson et al. 2008 ). The Texas A&M study argues that corn and oil play a small role in higher food prices, and that tight global supplies are more to blame. In addition, they find that the livestock industry is struggling with passing on costs. Regardless of the goodness or badness of ethanol production, it is being fueled by many factors, including mandated ethanol blends in fuel. In a study cosponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy and the American Coalition for Ethanol, from a fuel efficiency standpoint the optimal blend of ethanol is greater than 10 percent, and a mandate greater than this level would likely absorb an even larger share of the corn crop and increase competition for livestock producers.
Canadian Agricultural Programs
Contrary to public perception, there were very few government transfers to Canadian farmers prior to the 1970s (Schmitz, Furtan, and Baylis Farm income on the prairies has been negative for quite some time. For example, in Saskatchewan, between 1983 and 2007, farmers reported positive incomes only in 1996 (Figure 10 ). However, correspondingly, farm payments were positive for the negative-income years. At times, these annual farm payments exceeded Can$1 billion.
Survival of the Livestock Sector and the Crow's Nest Freight Rate (CROW)
A great deal of the discussion over high commodity prices ignores the red meat sector. This sector, which includes beef and pork, has taken a great hit because feed costs have risen significantly. This is true worldwide.
In the Canadian context, even with payouts under the CAIS program, the hog and beef cattle industries experienced heavy losses in 2007. For example, in the beginning of 2008, more than one-half of the hog establishments in Saskatchewan ceased operation. This was in part due to rapidly rising grain prices in 2007, which continued into 2008. One might question why, in the presence of the CAIS program, actual farm losses from livestock production were so large. Because 
Coalitions For and Against the CROW Change
It is interesting to recall the debate over eliminating the CROW transportation subsidy. At the time of the intense debate in the early 1990s, many argued that its elimination would spur increased livestock production through falling grain prices. Ironically, due to many factors, the strong belief that livestock would be the savior of prairie agriculture has weakened considerably. To make matters worse, the actual payment that producers received as CROW payouts was far less than suggested by economic analysis (Schmitz, Highmoor, and Schmitz 2002) . The CROW payout in 1996 totaled roughly Can$1.6 billion. Prior to 1996, the yearly government payments to the railways averaged Can$704.9 million from 1985 to 1995. Schmitz, Highmoor, and Schmitz (2002) calculate that full compensation would have been about Can$8.5 billion. This is in sharp contrast to the U.S. peanut and tobacco programs, where the buyout to eliminate these programs was greater than suggested by economic modeling (Schmitz, Schmitz, and Rossi 2006) .
EU Agricultural Policy
When the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was set up in the early 1960s, the European Union (EU) was a net cereal grains importer. Over time, because of technological change and other factors, the European Union became a net grain exporter. Carter and Schmitz (1979) argued that, at least prior to 1980, the European Union imposed the optimal welfare tariff on cereal imports. Later, the European Union, as it switched from net importer to exporter, provided for export subsidies. Over time, because of technology and other factors, the European Union became a net cereal exporter. There have been many changes to CAP over the years; they are discussed in detail in Swinbank (2008) . The most recent reform is the single farm payment scheme (SFP) initiated in 2003, under which producers are guaranteed compensatory payments through at least 2013. In addition, the European Union still maintains price supports that are well below market prices. Single farm payments were designed to further the degree of agricultural decoupling in the European Union. However, even though the EU policy is more decoupled, EU producers appear to be "laughing all the way to the bank" because of the double payments: one from the government and the other from the marketplace.
High Food Prices and the Fall in Tariff and Non-Tariff Barriers
High commodity prices have caused a significant increase in the cost of food imports (Table 3 ). There has been a dramatic increase in the import bill of major food commodities, except sugar, where expenditures have actually decreased.
High food prices have resulted in lower tariff and non-tariff barriers. The following points, quoted from Benjamin and Drajem (2008) , are of interest:
The surge in world food prices is accomplishing what seven years of trade talks haven't: knocking down import barriers.
The Doha round of global trade negotiations has been stalled since 2001 because developing nations have refused to lower import tariffs that protect their farmers and rich countries won't give up farm-price supports. Now, import duties are being slashed [globally] in response to prices that the World Bank says have risen 83 percent the past three years; subsidies in the U.S. and Europe are falling.
Since early 2007...developing nations have taken a raft of measures to increase imports.
India removed a 36 percent import tariff on wheat flour, and Indonesia eliminated duties on wheat and soybeans. Peru jettisoned tariffs on wheat and corn.
Turkey cut import taxes on wheat to 8 percent from 130 percent and on barley to zero from 100 percent. Mongolia scrapped its value-added tax on imported wheat and flour. 35 percent duty on wheat exports and Russia quadrupled wheat export taxes to 40 percent.
Details of selected country policy responses to high commodity prices are given in Table 4 . For example, Ecuador, India, and Boliva have eliminated tariffs on wheat and wheat flour. On the other hand, China has introduced export quotas on flour made of wheat, maize, and rice. This has also been the case for the exportation of Indonesian rice.
High Input Prices and Falling Commodity Prices
The news media focuses on high commodity prices and the corresponding price increase for food. Little attention is paid to the corresponding rising input prices. Consider the very simplistic model in Figure 11 . For a given price support of p s , output is q. The consumer price that clears the market is p c and government deficiency payments total p s p c ba.
Now suppose that the demand curve shifts to D′, but that there is no change in input prices. The price increases to p′ s , deficiency payments disappear, and producers gain p s aa′p′ s . But what happens if input costs also rise along with commodity prices? For a new supply curve S ′, which reflects rising input prices, the price increases to p. New producers gain only by an amount pef -p s ag.
A detailed study is not available on the degree to which rising input costs in 2007 and 2008 affect farm production costs (e.g., fertilizer prices have more than doubled since 1970; see Table 5 ). We argue that variable costs for grains, oilseeds, and pulse crops have increased by at least 20 percent.
In the context of Figure 11 , it is interesting to explore what happens if input costs remain high and commodity prices fall. From the U.S. per- 
Conclusion
In 2008, the United States implemented a new farm program. It contains many of the same elements as the previous farm bill. However, monies were added for the fruit and vegetable sectors. In terms of support levels for the basic commodities, including corn, wheat, rice, and cotton, support levels did not increase appreciably. In real terms, price supports have fallen dramatically. In view of world market prices, the only major export commodity where price supports are binding is cotton since prices are still below target levels. It appears that the new U.S. farm program did not make progress towards decoupling since the old mechanism design for income support remains and the buyouts that did occur for peanuts and cotton were prior to the 2008 U.S. Farm Bill. The net cost of U.S. farm policy is small for grains and oilseeds but much larger for cotton and sugar (Gardner 2002 , Schmitz, Furtan, and Baylis 2002 , Sumner 2007 . The European Union is moving more and more towards a decoupled program since it introduced the single farm payment scheme in 2003. Correspondingly, farmers will be paid yearly compensatory payments until at least 2015. This approach has reduced the welfare costs of the CAP. However, EU farmers not only receive these payments, but also additional market rents from high commodity prices. In a sense, the EU farmers are being paid twice: once from the government and again from the market. If the single payment scheme had not been introduced, farmers would have benefited from rising prices through market payments, but government payments would have been drastically reduced (i.e., compensatory payments would not have been made-a situation similar to the United States).
With the sharp rise in commodity prices, several observations are of importance. With respect to the European Union, what level of support remains since the support levels upon which compensatory payments were made are no longer binding. If prices fall to old levels, the threshold prices will once again become binding. Second, given high commodity prices, the welfare costs of the U.S. and EU policies have been greatly reduced. In addition, the treasury outlays have been greatly reduced. For example, in the United States in 2008, except for direct payments, cotton will be the only major commodity receiving government payments. (As of November 1, 2008, the price of U.S. cotton was roughly 30 cents per pound below the target price.) Some contend that high commodity prices are now moving the world toward freer tradesomething that trade negotiations have not been able to do. However, freer trade brought about by higher commodity prices has much different welfare implications than freer trade brought about by the removal of distortions caused by farm subsidies. In standard analysis, the prices of commodities under price support systems fall for exporters in the move toward freer trade. However, in today's reality, this may no longer be the case, because commodity prices in exporting countries have risen along with the removal of trade and policy distortions. 
